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Abstract 
 
 
‘Capture Ready’ is a design concept enabling fossil fuel plants to be retrofitted more 
economically with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies, however financing 
the cost of capture ready can be problematic, especially in the developing world.  We propose 
that fossil fuel plants issue tradable Capture Options to acquire financing. The Capture Option 
concept could move CCS forward politically in countries such as China, speed up CCS 
technology development, help Capture Ready investors diversify risk, and offer global 
warming investors an alternative investment opportunity. As a detailed case study, we assess 
the value of a Capture Option and Capture Ready plant for a 600 MW supercritical pulverized 
coal power plant in China, using a cash flow model with Monte-Carlo simulations.  The gross 
value of Capture Ready varies from CNY3m ($0.4m) to CNY633m ($84.4m) at an 8% 
discount rate and the Capture Option is valued at CNY113m ($15.1m) to CNY1255m 
($167.3m) for two of the four scenarios analyzed.  
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List of Abbreviations 
 
CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) 
CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) 
CEC (China Electricity Council) 
CER (Certified Emissions Reduction) 
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) 
CHNG (China Huaneng Group) 
CNY (Chinese Currency: Yuan) 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry in the UK) 
EAF (Equivalent Availability Factor) 
EBITDA (Earning Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization) 
EIA (Energy Information Administration) 
EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) 
ETS (Emissions Trading Scheme) 
FGD (Flue Gas Desulphurisation) 
FY (Financial Year) 
Huaneng (Huaneng Power International, Inc.) 
IEA (International Energy Agency)  
IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle) 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)  
LHV (Low Heating Value) 
Local EPA (Local Environment Protection Administration in China) 
MLR (Ministry of Land and Resource in China) 
MOF (Ministry of Finance in China) 
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 NPV (Net Present Value) 
NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) 
O&M (Operating & Maintenance) 
PC Power Plant (Pulverized Coal Fired Power Plant) 
ROA (Real Options Analysis) 
SAT (State Administration of Taxation in China) 
SC-PC (Supercritical Pulverized Coal Fired Power Plant) 
SEPA (State Environment Protection Administration in China) 
SERC (State Electricity Regulatory Commission in China) 
Solar PV Power (Solar Photovoltaic Power) 
Std Dev (Standard Deviation) 
USC-PC Power Plant (Ultra Supercritical Pulverized Coal Fired Power Plant) 
WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) 
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 1. Background 
 
1.1 Background to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
In October 2006, the Stern Review, commissioned by the British government, described the 
economic impacts of climate change, as well as the business opportunities if action is taken. 
According to Stern, mitigating climate change is urgent and acting now could save more 
money in the future, so it ‘must be treated as an investment, a cost spent now and the 
following years to avoid the risk of serious damages in the future’ (Stern, 2006: 171). 
According to the International Energy Agency, fossil fuel power plants are the single largest 
source of carbon dioxide, accounting for more than 40% of CO2 emissions globally, and the 
trend is likely to continue through 2050 (IEA, 2006). The largest increase in emissions comes 
from the power sector. 
 
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that worldwide installed 
electricity generating capacity will grow from 3,710 GW in 2003 to 6,349 GW in 2030, of 
which coal-fired power plants will contribute 1997 GW in 2030, accounting for 31% of the 
total electricity capacity (EIA, 2006). The growth will increasingly come from the large 
emerging economies of the developing world.  In China alone, more than 200 GW of new 
fossil fuel fired power generation (virtually all coal) capacity was added from 2004 to 2006 
(NDRC, 2007).  IEA projects that between 2006 and 2030 China and India will produce more 
CO2 emissions from energy than the US, EU and Japan combined (IEA, 2007).  Moreover, 
this is not a problem that can be ignored for many years before being addressed; as seen in 
Figure 1, plants built over the next decade will produce emissions for many decades to come.  
 
Thus, carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies, by which CO2 is captured when 
generating power and injected underground for storage (as shown in Figure 2), is described by 
the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as ‘the most promising way to stabilise 
greenhouse gas content in the atmosphere’ (DTI, 2003). In January 2007, the European 
Commission stated that CCS should be the standard in coal-fired power generation from 2020 
(EC, 2007). Yet in spite of the great interest, CCS technologies are at a relatively early stage 
in terms of systems integration.  The IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme lists a half-dozen 
“integrated systems demonstration projects” and almost 20 storage demonstration projects, 
but some have encountered difficulties and others are quite small in size (IEA GHG, 2007).   
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Figure 1 CO2 Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Stations built prior to 2015 in China & India 
(IEA, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 2 Schematic Diagram of a CCS system 
Source: http://www.co2captureproject.org/technologies/tech_index.htm 
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 Given the high costs (Table 1) and uncertainties over the technology (Table 2), currently, 
there is insufficient incentive to deploy CCS on a large scale before 2015 in most countries. In 
the long term, if deep cuts in carbon dioxide emissions become necessary, carbon prices may 
rise to levels that will make CCS economic (Venkataraman and Lundberg, 2007). 
 
Table 1 2002 Cost Ranges for components of CCS systems. (IPCC, 2007: 43, Table TS.9) 
 
 
Table 2 Maturity of CCS Components 
An ‘X’ indicates the component is considered mature (IPCC, 2006: 21, Table TS.1) 
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 1.2 Getting Ready for Carbon Dioxide Capture & Storage 
Making new fossil fuel plants Capture Ready would enable them to retrofit to capture CO2 
during their lifetime more easily and economically. The extra cost to retrofit a Capture un-
Ready plant over the long-term compared with a hypothetical Capture Ready design is 
demonstrated in Table 3.  
 
Supercritical PC  
(86% Net  Emissions Reduction)   Capture un-ready Capture ready 
Original Efficiency %LHV 42 42 
Efficiency Penalty %LHV 9.5 8.5 
Capture plant capital cost (above 
original) % 45.8 24.6 
Estimated additional O&M cost % 70 43 
Table 3 Relative Benefits  of Capture Ready (Gibbins, Li, and Liang 2006) 
 
Following the G8 Gleneagles Plan of Action (G8, 2005), the IEA was asked to investigate the 
definition of Capture Ready that would avoid Capture “lock-in” and lower retrofit costs. The 
UK Energy Review published in April 2006 also indicated the importance of exploring 
Capture Ready technologies (DTI, 2006).  
 
At the UK-China Cleaner Energy Technology and Policy Workshop in Xiamen China, Otter 
(2006) suggested that Capture Ready plants could be employed in the near- to mid-term 
(around 2012) as a transitional pathway towards the long-term goal of zero emissions (Figure 
3).  
 
Figure 3  Pathway to Zero Emissions Power for Fossil Fuels (Otter, 2006) 
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 A number of companies are considering making their plants Capture Ready. Table 4 below 
shows examples of industry efforts to plan for new plants to be Capture Ready since, to date, 
there have been no government mandates. Two UK projects related to making power plants 
Capture Ready were proposed shortly after HM Treasury emphasized the importance of 
Capture Ready (HM Treasury 2006). In Canada, SaskPower is working on the feasibility 
study to compare the economics of capture plants with renewables. And the proposed SASOL 
Coal to Liquid (CTL) project is proposing a design with Capture Ready in China, even though 
China has no obligation to reduce CO2 emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Data Company Activity 
2006.6 Scottish and 
Southern Energy 
(SSE) & Mitsui 
(now Doosan) 
Babcock 
Retrofit SSE’s 500 MW Ferrybridge Power Station in 
Yorkshire by installing Mitsui Babcock’s supercritical 
boiler and turbine unit onsite to facilitate the subsequent 
development of post-combustion technology for carbon 
capture and storage (SSE 2006).  
2006.10 E.ON-UK A proposal to build two new 800 MW coal-fired power 
plants with Capture Ready in Kent.  If successful, the plant 
could be operational by 2012 (Platts 2006) 
2006 SASOL Study the feasibility of building two 80,000 barrels per day 
(bpd) CTL plants in China, with Capture Ready (SASOL 
2006).  
2006 RWE-UK Feasibility study of two 800 MW post-combustion Capture 
Ready plant in Tilbury. A future plan for a 3x800 MW 
Capture Ready plant in Blyth. (RWE, 2006) 
Table 4 Industry Proposals for Capture Ready Design 
 
2. Defining Capture Ready 
 
2.1 Alternative Definitions of Capture Ready 
Since 2000, General Electric (GE) has conducted many studies on coal-fired Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plants to obtain ‘CO2 sequestration ready’ 
design (GE-EER, 2000). Their studies mainly focused on adopting pre-combustion capture 
technology to capture carbon dioxide, while at the same time producing high concentration 
hydrogen. In this case, Capture Ready means that the entire module for capturing CO2 is built 
onsite during plant construction.  
 
Gibbins (2004) suggested Capture Ready as being “Plant designed to have CO2 capture added 
at some time in the future with minimal impact of lifetime economic performance.”  Aside 
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 from technical design, a critical element in any Capture Ready proposal is the need for the 
physical space to accommodate the additional plant needed.   
 
The idea has also become popular among some environmental groups. In December 2004, the 
US environmental group Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)’s China Clean Energy 
Project listed ‘promoting the development of Capture Ready in China for coal gasification 
based poly-generation (co-production of electricity and chemicals) as one of their national 
initiatives (NRDC, 2004).  
 
Wilson and Gibbins (2005) raised a broader concept of ‘Capture Ready’ in early 2005. Their 
suggestions for Capture Ready include: 
“a) Making sure that new fossil fuel plants of all types are built so that, within the limits of the 
best current understanding, they can have capture retrofitted in the future with the 
minimum additional cost and performance penalty.  
b) Improving the technologies that will be needed to convert these 'capture ready' plants (and 
other existing plants) to capture CO2, and feeding experience from this back into capture 
ready plant design.  
c) Making sure that any additional technologies that may not be so competitive until CO2 
capture becomes the norm are also developed for rapid deployment when they will be 
needed. 
d) Developing proven and socially acceptable CO2 storage options. ” 
 
Rosenberg et al (2005) suggested legislative language in the US context that Capture Ready 
design for IGCC plant: ‘be capable of accommodating the equipment likely to be necessary to 
capture the carbon dioxide that would otherwise be emitted in flue gas from the project’. 
Although Rosenberg et al mentioned a plant should be capable of being retrofitted into a 
capture plant for its sustainable use, it does not require any technology investigation to 
support that the plant is built for a cheaper retrofit. Moreover, Capture Ready should not be 
restricted to IGCC plants but applied to conventional Pulverized Coal (PC) plants as well. 
 
Capture Ready should not be restricted to ‘Capture’ alone in the sense that a CCS project will 
need to be integrated across Capture, Transport and Storage. Accordingly, the concept of 
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 Capture Ready should ideally incorporate plant siting to allow as much as possible of the 
captured CO2 to be transported to the storage site in order to lower the total cost of the whole 
CCS process.  
 
In March 2006, in a paper published by HM Treasury, Capture Ready was given a broad and 
simple explanation, and it spelled out the key issue for a capture ready plant, i.e., it should be 
less expensive to retrofit the plant (HM Treasury, 2006: 4). 
 
Bohm et al define Capture Ready to mean: ‘if, at some point in the future [the plant] can be 
retrofitted for carbon capture and sequestration and still be economical to operate.’  Moreover, 
they conThe concept of ‘capture-ready’ is not a specific plant design; rather it is a spectrum of 
investments and design decisions that a plant owner might undertake during the design and 
construction of the plant. (Bohm, Herzog, Parsons and Sekar, 2007: 114) 
 
In February 2007, Scott Brockett from DG Environment within the European Commission, 
suggested all new coal-fired power generation plants prior to 2020 must be Capture-Ready 
and retrofit rapidly after 2020 (Brockett, 2007a). In July 2007, a Capture Ready study by the 
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) warned that ‘lack of clear definition will hamper 
a low carbon economy’ (IChemE, 2007). However, the European Commission has chosen not 
to give detailed definition of Capture Ready requirements. Intending to require capture on all 
coal plants after 2020, Commission officials possibly have taken the view that firms will be 
penalized at a later date for any corners cut and so there is no need for any explicit definition 
similar to ‘the Broad Sense Capture Ready’ definition given in Section 2.2 (Brockett 2007b).  
 
2.2 Broad Sense Capture Ready and Narrow Sense Capture Ready 
Liang (2006) summarized and classified existing Capture Ready explanations and definitions 
into ‘Broad Sense’ and ‘Narrow Sense’ categories. As its name implies, supporters of a 
‘Broad Sense’ Capture Ready believe that any design or investment that can ease retrofitting a 
plant with carbon dioxide capture and storage in the future can be called Capture Ready, 
while the proponents of ‘Narrow Sense’ Capture Ready insist that a plant must be in 
compliance with specific technical requirements to claim Capture Ready status.  
 
Under this classification system, the GE and NRDC definitions would be considered Narrow 
Sense Capture Ready, and the HM Treasury, Gibbins and Bohm et al explanations fall under 
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 the Broad Sense definition of Capture Ready. Generally, the Broad Sense definition of 
Capture Ready is better than the Narrow Sense definition for expansion investments, whereas 
when Capture Ready is mandatory, the Narrow Sense definition is preferred. Companies from 
industry in developed countries have started to become aware of the value of making new 
fossil fuel plants Capture Ready based on the broad sense definition. Some power companies 
are planning to invest using internal financial resources (NRDC, 2004). 
 
How can new plants be encouraged to become Capture Ready? An obvious way to stimulate 
Capture Ready would be to develop and announce a clear timetable for imposing CCS 
regulations, because it would help power companies judge what the optimal investment would 
be by assessing the risks or opportunities of mandatory CCS in the future. However, this kind 
of regulatory signal on CCS has not yet been occurred in major industrialized countries let 
alone in developing countries. A major potential hurdle of facilitating new plants is 
information inefficiency, partly due to inconsistent interests and different decision-making 
criteria used by power companies and regulators.  
 
 
3. Prospects for Financing Capture Ready in Developing Countries 
 
3.1 Current Obstacles to Financing Capture Ready 
Capture Ready does not reduce emissions directly, and therefore it is not eligible to be 
financed through either the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) or the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) available to developing countries. Unlike developed countries, where 
there is a credible possibility that governments will mandate CCS on all new coal plants in the 
near future, developing countries such as China will need to rely on outside investors to 
encourage Capture Ready, at least in the short term.  
 
Furthermore, China is building more new coal-fired power capacity than anywhere else in the 
world. However, the current prospects for financing Capture Ready in China are not 
promising. Reiner et al (2007) conducted a survey of more than 100 key opinion leaders on 
CCS in China. Capture Ready, described as a pre-investment option to ease retrofitting to 
Capture in the future, was recognized as an option by a majority of respondents, but about 
half of respondents suggested that the Chinese government should not intervene in the 
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 Capture Ready decisions of individual projects. Industry, especially the electric power 
industry, was also found to be risk averse with respect to Capture Ready investment. As a 
result, the chance of incentivising Capture Ready through existing channels, whether through 
the Chinese government, industry or the CDM is low in the near term.  
 
3.2 An Innovative Approach to Finance Capture Ready 
Capture Ready is crucial, but attracting conventional financing sources is not currently viable. 
In order to finance newly built fossil fuel power plants to become Capture Ready, we 
introduce the concept of a tradable Capture Option and provide estimates of its value.  
 
Section 4 introduces the principles and benefits of Capture Options. By employing Monte 
Carlo simulations with a randomized cash flow model, Section 5 evaluates the net present 
value (NPV) for both Capture Options and Capture Ready investments for the case of a 600 
MW supercritical FGD unit. In the following sections we seek to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
 How can a Capture Option help finance Capture Ready? 
 What is the potential benefit of Capture Ready? 
 What is the value of a Capture Option? 
 
 
4. Benefits and Challenges of Trading Capture Options 
 
4.1 Definition of a Capture Option 
A Capture Option is an option contract which stipulates that one party (the holder) has the 
right (but not the obligation) to exercise the contract to require the capture of CO2 on or 
before a future date (the exercise date or expiration) and the other party is a stationary CO2 
emitter such as a power plant owner. A perfect Capture Option is an American-style option, 
which allows the option holder to exercise their option to capture CO2 at any time before 
expiration. If the prospect of CO2-enhanced oil recovery (EOR) is not available, the 
underlying asset is the carbon credit price, while the strike price is the floating opportunity 
cost of retrofitting to Capture, which primarily depends on the costs and risks of capture 
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 technologies, fuel cost, and the prices of, and demand for, products (e.g. electricity, cement). 
in the base plant. If EOR prospects do exist, then the oil price will also be an underlying asset .  
 
4.2 Potential Market in Capture Options 
 
Capture Options will be issued by new or existed stationary CO2 sources, including  
fossil fuel power plants, and a range of other industries where capturing CO2 would be viable 
including cement, fertilisers, iron and steel, and petrochemicals.  By purchasing capture 
options, the option holders will be able to exercise the options, Capture CO2 and then inject it 
into underground thereby generating carbon credit and/or returns from EOR whenever 
economic. CCS operating companies, oil companies and power companies may therefore 
have a relatively high synergy in deciding to exercise Capture Options.  
 
4.3 Opportunities to Profit from Capture Options 
How can investors in Capture Options make a profit? If option holders decide to exercise the 
option - which means retrofitting the other party’s plant to capture CO2, their potential benefit 
is the net cash flow generated by CO2 emissions reductions or other CO2 utilization 
opportunities such as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR). Similar to other financial options, an 
option holder is also able to make a profit by selling options to other investors before the 
expiry date of the option.  
 
4.4 Financing and Optimizing Capture Ready 
By selling Capture Options, the shareholders of fossil fuel plant get extra cash inflow 
immediately, and part of the money may be spent to achieve some level of Capture Ready. To 
optimize the economic benefits, shareholders in fossil fuel plants will continue to invest in 
Capture Ready if the marginal price of the Capture Option is higher than the marginal cost of 
Capture Ready investments (Capture Ready here is based on the Board Sense definition of 
Capture Ready, as described in Section 2.2, ‘any design or investment that can ease 
retrofitting a plant with Carbon Capture and Storage in future can be called Capture Ready’). 
 
4.5 Other Benefits of Issuing a Capture Option 
CCS Investment Opportunities in Focus 
For investors, the demand for global warming investment products is growing rapidly (Clarke, 
2006). Capture Options create an alternative global warming investment opportunity, which, 
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 for the first time, allows investors to acquire returns from the development of CCS without 
directly investing in the power generation or oil industry. It helps to introduce more investors 
into the world of CCS by developing a financial instrument with broader appeal.  
 
Accelerating CCS Development 
Once institutional investors hold large quantities of Capture Options, they may tend to 
increase the value of their holding immediately by engaging in political activities such as 
promoting methodologies to introduce CCS into the CDM or advising policymakers to reduce 
regulatory hurdles to CCS. Alternatively, technology development will increase the price of a 
Capture Option by reducing an option’s exercise price, which is the cost of retrofitting a plant 
to capture CO2.  
 
Secure Emissions Reduction Target 
A government or its agencies can purchase and deposit a large number of Capture Options at 
relatively low cost to secure their long-term emissions reduction target or commitment. For 
instance, if the British government had purchased Capture Options for new coal fired plants 
built in China in 2005 and 2006, then the UK would easily achieve even the most ambitious 
emissions reduction targets by exercising a fraction of their options. Emissions reductions 
generated from capturing CO2 at all new coal-fired plants built in 2005 and 2006 in China 
would be more than twice the emissions from the entire power sector in the UK.  
 
Facilitating EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) in Future 
Demand-side investors such as oil companies are potential holders of capture options, because 
purchasing Capture Options enables them to secure their future CO2 supplies for potential 
EOR projects in advance. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of investing in Capture un-Ready 
plant because of inefficient information dissemination between fossil plants and oil 
companies, and the time lag between plant constructions and using the CO2 in EOR, can be 
recovered and reflected in the value of Capture Option.  
 
Managing the Risks of Capture Ready Investments 
From a risk management point of view, investment in Capture Ready may be exposed to 
higher risk of ‘Capture Lock-in’ in the absence of an active market of tradable Capture 
Options. For example, if a local government instituted a ban on CCS because of concerns 
over pipeline leakage in a high population density area, a plant would not be able to use CCS 
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 even though carbon prices might be high enough to make it profitable. However, if there is an 
active capture options market, the risk and benefits of Capture Ready investment will be 
easier to quantify or transfer. By trading Capture Options, plant shareholders can manage 
their non-systematic risk more efficiently. For example, in theory, investors in fossil fuel 
plants could sell part of the Capture Option of their home plant and purchase Capture Options 
from other plants located in different regions or investors who have different risk perceptions 
could diversify the non-systematic risk of ‘Capture lock-in’. 
 
Capture Ready - No longer a cost 
As described in greater detail in Section 5, Capture Options not only increase the value of a 
project significantly but also reduces the risk from carbon prices for a new coal-fired unit - 
measured in terms of the standard deviation (Std dev). The analysis in Section 5 also shows 
that a Capture Option for a 600 MW supercritical FGD unit in China would be worth over one 
hundred million Chinese yuan ($14m) using a 8% discount rate in two of four scenarios 
thereby increasing the project’s initial cash flow.  
 
Finally, the most important benefit of a Capture Option is to make shareholders of fossil fuel 
plants become more aware of the real options value of capturing CO2 and to optimize the 
options’ value by investing in some level of Capture Ready based on the broad sense 
definition. In other words, the option to capture CO2 would come to be regarded as an ‘asset’ 
rather than a ‘liability’, and in the meantime while a Capture Ready investment may lift the 
value of a project. 
 
4.5 Potential Hurdles of Issuing Capture Options 
Liquidity Risks and Possible Solutions 
Only one capture option would be available for each generation unit, and the economic 
prospects of Capture are not identical among generation units, thus it is difficult to generate a 
liquid exchange trading market for capture options trading directly.  Capture options would be 
suitable for over-the-counter (OTC) trading, which involves trading between two parties. 
However, we suggest creating professionally-run capture option funds managed by CCS and 
financial experts.  Such funds would allow for options to be traded liquidly on an exchange 
and can increase bargaining power, the efficiency of option pricing and decisions regarding 
retrofitting.  
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 Regulatory Hurdles 
In some countries, including China, issuing and trading Capture Options will be subject to the 
permission or authorization of national governments, adding some additional uncertainties. 
Uncertainties in approving CCS projects may therefore reduce the value of a Capture Option. 
The multiple uncertainties characteristic of Capture Options may lead to difficulties in pricing.  
 
Maintaining Capture Ready Infrastructure 
The owners of power plants may be reluctant to maintain Capture Ready infrastructure after 
issuing Capture Options because they are not likely to benefit from exercising the options by 
retrofitting to Capture. One solution is to require that Capture Ready settings in place at the 
time of issuing the Capture Option be maintained either through regulation or via contract. On 
the other hand, the willingness to maintain Capture Ready may be enhanced if the original 
plant owners keep a proportion of the Capture Options.  
 
Asymmetric Information 
Plant owners will know earlier and more about the status of their plants, which influences the 
option price and would give them an advantage over other investors.  Setting up an 
independent accreditation body and regulating the trading activities of those who hold non-
public information may help reduce the danger of insider trading.  
 
 
5. Pricing Capture Options: Building the Model Applied to a Case Study  
 
5.1 Methodology  
 
Valuing Capture Options 
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume mean net present value (NPV) of total cash flow 
as the main investment decision criteria. NPV is the net present value of the future after-tax 
cash flows after subtracting initial investment outlay and adding present value of terminal 
year non-operating cash flow, or 
           n
n
t
t
t
r
TNOCFOutlay
r
CF
NPV
)1()1(1 ++−+= ∑=                    (2-1) 
Where  
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      CFt = after-tax cash flow at year t 
r = required rate of return for the investment (or discount rate) 
Outlay = investment cash flow at time zero 
n = life of the power project 
TNOCF = terminal year after-tax non-operating cash flow 
 
We project the value of a Capture Option by subtracting the ‘mean NPV of total cash flow of 
a project without the option of retrofitting to Capture during its lifetime’ from ‘mean NPV of 
total cash flow of a project with the option of retrofitting to Capture’: 
                        optionwithoutoptionwithOption NPVNPVValue −− −=              (2-2) 
where 
NPVwith-option = net present value of total cash flow with retrofitting option 
NPVwithout-option = net preset value of total cash flow without retrofitting option 
 
In order to estimate the mean NPV of total cash flow including options for retrofitting to 
Capture, a decision equation with regard to retrofit timing is required. The model assumes that 
plant owners or Capture Option holders will retrofit the plant to capture CO2 at year T when 
the projected average NPV of total future cash flow with retrofitting is larger than the 
projected average NPV of future cash flow without retrofitting:  
        Retrofitting to Capture if  option
n
Tt
Tt
tretrono
n
Tt
Tt
tretro eValu
r
CF
r
CF ′++>+ ∑∑ = −−= − )1()1( __           (2-3) 
where 
  CFretro_t = after-tax randomized cash flow at year t with retrofitting to Capture 
  CFno-retro_t = after-tax randomized cash flow at year t without retrofitting to Capture 
Value’option = the option value of retrofitting to Capture in the future 
  T = retrofitting year 
  n = life of the power project 
 
Benefits of Capture Ready 
The additional capital outlay needed to make a new plant Capture Ready will depend upon the 
siting of the plant, engineering design and local costs of reserving additional land, thus we 
focus on the gross value (before capital outlay) of Capture Ready:  
nocroptioncroptioncr ValueValueGValue −− −=                    (2-4) 
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 where 
GValuecr = value of Capture Ready before capital outlay of Capture Ready 
Valueoption-nocr = value of Capture Option without Capture Ready 
Valueoption-cr = value of Capture Option with Capture Ready 
 
A distinct advantage of building new plants with Capture Ready is increasing the cumulative 
probability of retrofitting to Carbon Capture economically over the course of a plant’s 
lifetime: 
                                (2-5) ∏
=
−−− −−=−=
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pp                 (2-6) 
where 
       Pcapture-T = cumulative probability of retrofitting to Capture at Year T 
       Puncapture-T = cumulative probability of not yet retrofitting to Capture at Year T 
pcapture-T = probability of retrofitting to Capture at Year T 
 
The net value of Capture Ready is equal to the ‘gross value of Capture Ready’ less ‘additional 
capital outlay on Capture Ready’: 
                                     crcrcr OutlayGValueValue −=                             (2-7) 
where 
        Valuecr = Net Value of Capture Ready (after capital outlay) 
        GValuecr = Gross Value of Capture Ready (before capital outlay) 
        Outlaycr = Capital Outlay on Capture Ready 
 
A proper Capture Ready design should have little impact on operating performance and the 
capital required for Capture Ready investment is much smaller than the outlay for the baseline 
PC plant. Therefore, we ignore the operating risk after Capture Ready investment and assume 
the Capture Ready investment decision will not affect the required return of capital.  
 
Cash Flow Components 
The underlying power project in the study is a new investment, thus the initial capital outlay 
is equal to investment in new fixed capital plus investment in net working capital.  
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                                   NWCInvFCInvOutlay +=                                (2-8) 
where 
        FCInv = Investment in new fixed capital 
        NWCInv = Investment in net working capital 
 
The annual after-tax operating cash flow is equal to ‘revenue (or sales) less cash operating 
expenses and tax expense, plus depreciation charge’:  
                                    ttttt DTaxDCSCF +−−−= )1)((                     (2-9) 
where 
St = revenue from electricity sales at year t 
   Ct = cash operating expenses (fuel cost + carbon cost + other O&M costs) at year t 
   Dt = depreciation charge at year t 
Tax = corporate tax rate  
 
We assume the salvage value is zero at the end of the project. Therefore the terminal year 
non-operating cash flow is equal to:  
 
                                     (2-10) TNBTaxNWCInvTNOCF ×+=
where 
       TNOCF = terminal year after-tax non-operating cash flow 
       BBTN = book value of fixed capital on the terminal date 
 
Options of Terminating ahead of Schedule 
If the prospect of continuous operation (with a retrofit option or after retrofitting to Capture) 
is extremely unfavourable, the underlying plant will be closed down ahead of its designed life. 
We assume that the plant will be terminated if the spot NPV of future cash flows with closure 
options is lower than zero.  
 
5.2 Assumptions 
In order to run ‘near-realistic’ scenarios, we make a series of assumptions based on historical 
data and adjusted for potential inflation and growth, including technical performance without 
capture of CO2, the technical performance with capture of CO2, financial environment and 
market forecasts. The assumptions are summarized in Table 5.  
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 Technical Performance Assumptions without Capture 
Unit Type Supercritical Pulverized Coal 
Installed Capacity  600 MW 
Start-Construction Timing 1st Jan 2010 
Construction Cycle 24 months (low scenario); 36 months (high scenario) 
Operating Life 2012-2050 
Average Capacity Load Period %  Period % 
 2012-2020 80%-90%  2031-2040 70%-80% 
 2021-2030 75%-85%  2041-2050 65%-75% 
Power Supply Efficiency 42% 
Emissions Factors 0.79 ton CO2/MWh 
Capital Outlay CNY3750/kW (2003 base) plus extra 5% working capital 
O&M cost CNY134.4m (2006 base) 
Technical Performance Assumptions with Capture 
Additional Capital Outlay* Without Capture Ready 45.8% above original 
*with 5% working capital With Capture Ready 24.6% above original 
Efficiency Penalty Without Capture Ready 9.5% 
 With Capture Ready 8.5% 
Additional O&M Cost Without Capture Ready 70% above without Capture 
 With Capture Ready 43% above without Capture 
Average Capacity Load Period %  Period % 
 2012-2020 85-95%  2031-2040 80%-90% 
 2021-2030 75%-85%  2041-2050 70%-80% 
Possible Retrofitting Year 2017, 2022, 2027, 2032, 2037, 2042, 2047 
Transport, Storage, and 
Monitoring costs 
CNY 0.6 (low) to CNY 16.3 (high) per metric ton CO2 
Financial Environment 
Corporate Tax Rate 25% 
Depreciation Schedule 10-year straight line 
Required Return (not fixed) 6%, 8%, 10%, 12% 
Market Assumptions 
Inflation Basic 1.5 (Low), 4.5%(High) 
 O&M 1.5 times of basic inflation 
 Fixed Capital 3.4% 
Coal Prices Base CNY338 (2006) 
 Std dev 10% 
 Annual Growth = basic inflation 
Carbon Prices Base CNY80/ton (2006) 
 Std dev 20% (pre-2020), 10% (post- 2020)
 Annual Growth 4.5% (low); 8% (high) 
Electricity Prices Base CNY349.1/MWh (2006) 
 Std dev 2.5% 
 Annual Growth = basic inflation 
Correlation (coal, carbon) -10% (low), -60% (high) 
Correlation (electricity, coal) 20% (low), 80% (high) 
Table 5 Model Assumptions Summary 
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 Technical Performance Assumptions without Capture 
In January 2007, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced the 
closure of a total of 50 GW of small coal-fired generation units by 2010 in order to reduce 
coal consumption and local air pollution (NDRC, 2007). Meanwhile, NDRC (2007) indicated 
that new-built coal-fired power plants should at least have the capacity and the thermal 
efficiency equivalent to a 600 MW supercritical plant or an ultrasupercritical unit if at all 
possible. Therefore, 600 MW or larger supercritical coal-fired units seem likely to become 
dominant in China in the short term.  
 
Due to multiple uncertainties, we apply a cash flow model with Monte Carlo (MC) 
simulations to conduct a scenario analysis of the value of a 600 MW supercritical coal-fired 
project, which is assumed to begin construction in 2010 in China. The simulation applies 
10,000 trials as it achieved a standard error of less than 1% consistently. The technical and 
operating assumptions are based on Huaneng’s 600 MW supercritical units finished 
construction between 2004 and 2006 and then adjusted as appropriate. Huaneng Power 
International Corporation, a subsidiary of China Huaneng Group, is one of the leading 
independent power companies in China, with shares actively traded in Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
and New York (as ADR).  
 
The construction cycle of 600 MW supercritical units built by China Huaneng Group (CHNG) 
and finished in 2006 varied from 24 to 35 months (CHNG, 2007). Accordingly, we assume 
the construction cycle is from 2 to 3 years in 2010. The average equivalent availability factor 
(EAF) of plants in the Huaneng Group is above 90% (CHNG, 2007). Considering the 
technical performance of the 600 MW supercritical units and the impact of an energy-
efficiency policy which allocates more generation quotas to higher efficiency units, we 
assume that the capacity load for a new supercritical unit constructed in 2010 would decrease 
from 85% to 70% over its 40 year lifetime (Table 6).  
 
Time period 2012-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 
Load Factor 80%-90% 75-85% 70-80% 65%-75% 
Output/yr (MWh) 4,467,600 4,204,800 3,942,000 3,679,200 
Table 6 Projected Average Capacity and Load Distribution of a 600 MW supercritical unit 
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 The power supply efficiencies of existing 600 MW supercritical units operated by Huaneng 
Group are between 41% and 43% (LHV). To simplify calculations, we assume the power 
supply efficiency of the underlying plant is 42%, consistent with the efficiency assumptions 
for the SC-PC plant scenario in Table 3.  
 
The historical initial capital investment for 2x600 MW SC-PC units in different regions of 
China was similar, varying between CNY4.4 billion and CNY4.6 billion at 2003 prices 
(CHNG, 2007; CPNN, 2007). Thus, we employ CNY2.25b ($300m) as the reference capital 
needed for a single 600MW supercritical unit in 2003 (excluding any provision for inflation), 
which is equivalent to CNY3750/kW ($500/kW) and we assume the working capital is 5% of 
total capital investment, which is CNY187.5/kW ($25/kW). To simplify the calculations, the 
total investment outlay after inflation adjustment is equally distributed across the first two 
construction years in the model. By linear approximation, Operating & Maintenance (O&M) 
cost (including labour cost, maintenance cost, environment, insurance and other 
administration costs) was estimated to be CNY134.4m for a 600 MW SC-PC unit in 2006 
(Huaneng Intl. Inc., 2007).  
 
Regarding the emissions factor, Rubin et al. (2005, quoted in IPCC 2006: 151) estimated a 
524 MW net output supercritical unit at 40.9% generation efficiency would emit 0.811 ton 
CO2/MWh without Capture, based on a 2.1% Sulphur bituminous coal. By linear 
approximation, assuming the same coal input, the carbon emissions factor of the underlying 
plant (42% efficiency, 600MW) in the model would be 0.79 ton CO2/MWh without Capture.  
 
The technical performance assumptions for a Capture Ready plant can be found in Table 3.  
 
Technical Performance with Capture 
 
As seen in Table 3, a plant that is not Capture Ready would require a premium of 75% above 
the original investment cost (versus 50% for a Capture Ready plant) and an additional year’s 
construction time to retrofit to Capture. Gibbins (2005) estimated that the efficiency penalty 
would be 9.5%, while O&M costs would be increased by 70%.  
 
The average capacity load factor after retrofitting to Capture is assumed to rise by 5% to 
recover part of the net output loss (Table 7).  
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Time period 2012-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 
Average Capacity Load 85%-95% 80%-90% 75%-85% 70%-80% 
Output/yr (MWh) 3,660,429 3,457,071 3,253,714 3,050,357 
Coal/yr (ton) 1,384,115 1,307,220 1,230,324 1,153,429 
 
Table 7 Projected Average Capacity Load Distribution of a 600 MW Supercritical Unit after 
Retrofitting to Capture 
 
Gibbins (2005) predicted that in a supercritical-FGD plant built with a specific Capture Ready, 
the retrofitting cost could be reduced to 50% above the original cost while the efficiency 
penalty would be reduced by 8.5%, and O&M cost would be increased by 43%, as stated in 
Table 3. The value of the Capture Option with Capture Ready is presented before deducting 
additional capital outlays for Capture Ready.   
 
In our model, retrofit timing takes advantage of the scheduled routine maintenance cycle 
(which normally takes four months). Therefore, the decision nodes on whether to retrofit is set 
at routine maintenance years which will be every five years starting from 2017 (Table 8).  
 
No. 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th 7th
Year 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 
 
Table 8 Projected Routine Maintenance Schedule of the Underlying 600 MW SC-PC (potential 
retrofitting year) 
 
Expert costs estimations of storage, monitoring and transport in Europe, US and Australia 
were between $0.3 to $8.6/mtCO2 (IPCC, 2006: 344). After adjustment for the implied 
purchasing power parity between China and major advanced economies, about 1 to 3.95 (IMF, 
2007), we assume that the costs of storage, monitoring and transportation are CNY0.6 to 
CNY16.3 /mtCO2 in 2006 respectively.  
 
Financial Environment 
In March 2007, the Tenth National People's Congress enacted the new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law ("New Law") which unified the income tax levied on domestic and foreign enterprises. 
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 The law introduced a single tax rate of 25% and takes effect on 1 January 2008 (Deloitte, 
2007). Therefore, for the supercritical unit in this model (starting operation in 2012) an 
income tax rate of 25% is assumed.  
 
The depreciation schedule can have a significant impact on cash flow net present value. In 
reality, the depreciation schedule should be designed to optimize the economic benefit of 
plant investors after complying with tax regulations. In China, the State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT) mandates that fixed assets at manufacturing facilities are depreciated by a 
minimum 10 years straight line method (SAT, 2000).  
 
Taxable earning in a consolidated statement of the parent company can be deducted by the un-
deducted amount (if the project records a loss) of fuel cost, fixed O&M cost, carbon cost, and 
depreciation in the individual project’s income statement. However, the tax shield effect may 
not be available when the parent company of the project records a continuously negative 
EBITDA (earning before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) over five years. 
Knowing only information for an individual project, it is difficult to estimate the financial 
situation of the parent company. Such an extreme financial-situation (continuous losses) poses 
difficulties in estimating the amount of tax saving. Therefore, the model assumes the 
contribution of tax saving from losses in a power project will reduce accordingly when annual 
EBITDA is projected to be negative in the following four normal-operating years.  
 
The discount rate has two components: the time value of money and the risk premium. We 
sought to develop a reference discount rate (required return) for Huaneng Power by using a 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) method based on publicly available information 
from financial markets in Hong Kong (converted into Chinese Yuan). The capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) approach found that over the past five years the cost of equity of 
Huaneng fluctuated between 14% and 16%, while the after-tax cost of debt was 4% to 6%. 
Using 1.25:1 as the debt to equity ratio over 2005-7 (Huaneng, 2007), the historical WACC-
implied discount rate (required return) is between 7.5% and 9.5%. On the other hand, the risk 
of an individual project may be quite different from the risk posed to the project’s parent 
company, which may have a well-diversified power investment portfolio, so it is difficult to 
determine a single incontestable discount rate. As a result, we conducted a sensitivity analysis 
for discount rates of 6%, 8%, 10%, and 12% rather than a single reference discount rate.  
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 Market Assumptions 
Using the historical time series of inflation in China through 2006 (IMF, 2007), the long term 
overall inflation rate is assumed to be 1.5% in the low scenario and 4.5% in the high scenario, 
whereas the inflation rate for O&M is assumed to be 1.5 times the basic inflation rate to 
reflect the rising costs of environmental protection and labour in China. The fixed-capital cost 
inflation is set at 3.4%, equivalent to the annual Chemical Engineering Plant Cost Index 
(CEPCI) from 1956 to 2005 (Brown, 2007). We also apply the long-term overall inflation rate 
to the costs of transport, storage, and monitoring.  
 
 Based on a review of various contract carbon prices for CDM projects in 2006, we assume 
the reference carbon prices for 2008 is CNY80/ton (€8/ton or $10.7/ton). The low and high 
annual growth scenarios are 4.5% and 8% respectively to reflect the increasing importance of 
mitigating climate change and a standard deviation of 20% is assumed to reflect the high 
volatility. Over time, we believe that the carbon price will be less volatile after the 
international regime has operated for a few years, thus, a 10% standard deviation for the 
carbon price is assumed post-2020.  
 
The model uses Huaneng’s average coal price, which was CNY338 per ton in 2006 (Huaneng, 
2007), and assumes that the change in price is identical to the expected inflation rate (2.5%) in 
the long term. The model also assumes two correlation scenarios between coal prices and 
carbon prices: -10% (low) and -60% (high).  
 
The adjusted average electricity price of Huaneng’s coal-fired power plants in 2006 was 
CNY349.1/MWh (Huaneng, 2007). As the costs of meeting environmental standards and 
labour costs are expected to increase rapidly over the long term, the growth rate of the 
electricity price is taken to be identical to the assumed basic inflation rate. Compared with the 
carbon price or the coal price, electricity prices are relatively stable, so a 2.5% standard 
deviation is assumed to reflect the price volatility. Beginning in 2005, NDRC started a new 
power pricing mechanism linking electricity prices with coal prices, although the mechanism 
is not fully implemented. Therefore, given the important potential link between the two prices, 
we assume two correlation scenarios between electricity prices and coal prices, for which 
64% of the volatility (R2) of the electricity price can be explained by coal price fluctuations in 
the high scenario and 4% in the low scenario.  
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5.3 Results 
 
The Value of the Capture Option 
What is the theoretical value of the Capture Option? The value of a Capture Option varies 
from CNY 1m to 471m ($0.1m to $62.8m) at a 10% discount rate in 2010, depending on the 
scenario (Figure 4). The coding of scenarios is described in Appendix I and the assumptions 
of selected scenarios are also highlighted in Table 9.  
 
The value of the capture option is sensitive to the input uncertainties.  The Capture Option 
amounts to CNY609 million ($81.2m) at a 6% discount rate with Capture Ready investment 
in the LP scenario (when the construction cycle, the capacity load before the Capture, the 
Transport, Storage and Monitoring cost, basic inflation, the correlation between coal prices 
and carbon prices, the correlation between electricity prices and carbon prices are all at their 
lower bounds and the capacity load after Capture and the growth in carbon prices are at their 
upper bound) (Table 9). On the other hand, the option is valued close to zero at a 12% 
discount rate without Capture Ready investment in scenario LP.  The impact of uncertainties 
on the Capture Option is described in Appendix I.  
 
 Scenarios 
Uncertainties HO LO HP LP 
Construction cycle Low High Low High 
Capacity load before Capture Low High High Low 
Capacity load after Capture High Low High Low 
Transport, storage and monitoring costs Low High Low High 
Inflation Low High High Low 
Carbon price growth High Low Low High 
Correlation (coal, carbon) Low High High Low 
Correlation (Electricity, carbon) Low High High Low 
HO: High Option Value; LO: Low Option Value; HP: High Project Value; LP: Low Project Value. 
Table 9 Assumptions of Selected Scenarios 
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nCR: without Capture Ready, CR: Capture Ready 
Figure 4 Scenario Analysis of Capture Option Value 
 
Besides revealing the value of a Capture Option, perhaps even more importantly, we found 
that the existence of a Carbon Capture Option may significantly raise the NPV of the 
underlying plant and reduce the standard deviation (std dev) of the project’s NPV, which 
serves as a proxy for risk.  
 
The potential impact of uncertainty on the project NPV is highlighted in Appendix I.  
 
The Value of Capture Ready Investment 
The pricing model reveals that the gross value of Capture Ready investment in the underlying 
plant are between CNY 3 million ($0.4m) and CNY 630 million ($84m) at a 8% discount rate.  
We also found that higher discount rates adversely affect the value of the Capture Option, as 
shown in Figure 5. For example, in scenario HO, the gross value of Capture Ready drops 
dramatically from 830m ($110.7m) at 6% discount rate to only CNY 71 million ($9.5m) at 
12%. In other words, if Capture Ready investment requires CNY 200 million ($26.7m), in 
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 scenario HO, the investment will be highly profitable at 6% discount rate but uneconomic at a 
12% discount rate.  
Value of Capture Ready in a 600MW SCPC in China
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Figure 5 NPV for Capture Ready under Different Scenarios 
 
Capture Ready investment may also increase the probability of retrofitting to Capture.  As 
shown in Figure 7, the probability of Capture increases significantly from 34% to 80% using 
an 8% discount rate in scenario LP. On the other hand, the probability of retrofitting is 
adversely affected by the discount rate.  
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Figure 6 Probability of Retrofitting to Capture in Scenario LP 
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 Closure Possibilities 
The option of capturing CO2 reduces the possibility of early closure of the underlying plant, 
especially in the LP and HO scenarios. Furthermore, Capture Ready investment also reduces 
the likelihood of shutdown. For example, in the LP scenario, at a discount rate of 8%, the 
probability of closure drops from nearly 100% to 75% because of the existence of CCS, while 
the possibility is further decreased to below 40% if there is a Capture Ready Investment. 
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Figure 7 Possibility of Early Termination in a Low Project Value (LP) Scenario 
 
Value of European Style Capture Options 
In order to analyse the conditional probability and option value of a specific year, we also 
modelled the value series of European-style Capture Options (i.e. allow option holders to 
exercise the option only on a specific date). The result shows the value and the retrofitting 
probabilities are extremely low after 2032, even in a high option value scenario (Table 10).  
On the other hand, Capture Ready investment lifts conditional probabilities significantly 
especially through 2032 (Figure 8).  
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The European Style Option Value in HO Scenario  
6%_nonCR 2017  2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 
spot 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Average 1592  1183  581  31  0  0  0  
Std Dev 546  771  690  205  0  0  0  
Std Err 17.26  24.37  21.83  6.48  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Max payoff 2872  3255  3591  2476  0  0  0  
Min payoff 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
  
6%_CR 2017  2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 
spot 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Average 2427  1812  1015  268  1  0  0  
Std Dev 551  865  828  565  20  0  0  
Std Err 17.41  27.36  26.19  17.85  0.63  0.00  0.00  
Max payoff 3589  3700  3335  2901  516  0  0  
Min payoff 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Table 10 Value of European Style Options in a Higher Option Value Scenario 
 
Conditional Retrofitting Probabilities in Scenario HO
(6% discount rate)
99%
3% 0% 0% 0%
94%
78%
26%
89%
59%
100%
1%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047
HO_nCR HO_CR
 
Figure 8 Conditional Probabilities of Retrofitting to Capture in HO Scenario 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The value of a Capture Option is significant in some scenarios, as the model results imply that 
a Capture Option for a 600MW SCPC project in China is worth CNY113m to 1255m at an 
8% discount rate in either LP scenario or HO scenario. However, in scenarios such as LO or 
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 HP, in which the costs of emissions is relatively low, the value of the Capture option is 
inconspicuous. At the same time, an option to retrofit the plant to Capture may reduce the 
operating risk associated with the cost of future carbon emissions reductions.  
 
Capture Ready investment lifts the value of Capture Option. The gross value of Capture 
Ready varies from CNY3m to CNY633m ($0.4m to $84.4m) at an 8% discount rate and the 
number reduces dramatically when discount rate goes up. To maximise the returns from 
issuing a Capture Option, plant owners may invest in Capture Ready if the required Capture 
Ready investment cost is less than the gross value of Capture Ready.  
 
Aside from the economic benefits, investing in Capture Ready significantly increases the 
probability of retrofitting to Capture becoming economic and reduces possibility of early 
termination of power plants, both of which may assist government’s potential regulatory 
policies for decarbonising fossil fuel plants and leads to mandates Capture in the future.  Of 
course, for this very reason, others might resist the introduction of Capture Ready.  
 
In January 2007, a preliminary report published by the China Electricity Council (CEC, 2007) 
showed the total installed coal fired capacity at the end of 2006 is 484.05 GW increased by 
over 90 GW in a single year. However, none of the planned or in-construction plants been 
designed as Capture Ready. Assuming an 8% discount rate and that a 1% average capital 
outlay would be needed to meet Gibbins’ Capture Ready definition, in LP scenario, roughly 
about CNY 48 billion ($6.4b) has already been lost for the Capture un-Ready of new thermal 
installed capacity in 2006 alone based on this model. As the latest projections from NDRC 
(2007) imply that new coal-fired capacity will grow by at least 50 GW per year through 2010, 
it is crucial to recover the value of Capture Ready.  
 
5.5 Limitations and Scope for Future Work 
 
Cost of Carbon Emissions 
We estimate a 2006 benchmark carbon price (cost) based on the current carbon price of CDM 
projects (CDM price) in China. However, as the project would operate from 2012 to 2050, the 
real shape of the carbon price may be much more complex than the carbon price assumed here. 
On the other hand, as of October 2007, there is still no approved methodology for including 
CCS in the CDM. Another critical factor is the timing and severity of any carbon constraints 
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 assumed by China at some later date.  Both the availability of CDM credit and Chinese 
constraints could be the subject of a more detailed uncertainty analysis.  
 
Likelihood of Alternative Scenarios 
The probability distribution of the different scenarios is unknown, and we have not chosen a 
single base case or reference scenario in order to describe the range of plausible outcomes.  
Nevertheless, associating probabilities with each scenario using methods such as expert 
elicitation would improve the model and narrow the band of outcomes, leading to a more 
precise value of Capture Options and Capture Ready.  
 
Chinese Policies on Climate Change  
The scenarios considered are those where the decision to capture CO2 is based on economics, 
whereas regulatory scenarios mandating capture are not included. Currently, China is not 
obliged to meet any carbon emissions reduction target and average per capita income in China 
is far below those countries that have assumed obligations to date.  It is virtually impossible to 
predict whether and when the Chinese government will announce a policy to require fossil 
fuel plants to capture CO2 or impose a punitive carbon tax, but recent news highlighting 
China overtaking the US as the leading emitter of CO2 emissions has brought new pressure 
for Chinese actions (even if the US has a population less than one-quarter the size of China). 
It seems reasonable to assume that some form of regulatory regime would be put in place well 
before 2050, the time horizon of our analysis.  
 
Other Operating Flexibilities 
The model considers options of closing down the plant ahead of schedule when the economic 
prospect is unfavourable, but does not take the possibilities of restarting the plant into account. 
In addition, the options of increasing electricity generation and reducing carbon credit 
production at favourable economic conditions are not built into the model. Adding additional 
options may substantially increase the project value.  
 
Technology Barriers and Policy Hurdles 
As of 2007, there is no commercial-scale CCS unit built, under construction or approved in 
China and global experience with full-scale CCS projects involving capture, transport and 
storage is minimal (IPCC, 2005).  Therefore, the uncertainties and potential hurdles from 
 32
 either the technology side or the regulatory side may significantly impair the value of Capture 
Options and Capture Ready.  
 
The Costs of Capture Ready 
The required capital outlay for Capture Ready is not given here, because the cost of Capture 
Ready can vary widely depending on the original design and location of a plant. Some factors 
such as property values and distance to storage site will affect the Capture Ready investment 
needed and transport cost significantly. For new SCPC plants, 1% of capital cost has been 
used as a reasonable assumption in Table 3 for achieving Capture Ready. Of course, a 
detailed engineering and economic assessment of a power plant project would need to use 
project-specific data and might yield quite different estimates.  Aggregating across plants, it 
should then be possible to build up an improved estimate of the capital cost associated with 
Capture Ready at the typical Chinese plant. 
 
Degree of Capture Ready 
The analysis in this section only considers a specific Capture Ready arrangement. In order to 
optimize the benefit of issuing a Capture Option, alternative configurations of Capture Ready 
should be evaluated and optimized for the case of real projects.  
 
The Cost of Capital 
Throughout the analysis, the discount rate is not affected by either retrofitting to Capture or 
Capture Ready investment. In theory, the variance (a proxy of risk) of the project value 
should be reduced after Capture Ready investment or retrofitting to Capture. On the other 
hand, in reality, the technology, policy and regulatory uncertainties associated with Capture 
Ready and CCS may increase the discount rate. It is hard to make a quantitative conclusion 
regarding the net effect. Further research in this area is essential, because the model results are 
highly sensitive to the discount rate.  
 
Behavioural Finance in the Decision-making Process 
The model assumes the investor’s decision to build a new power plant, close down a plant, 
retrofit a plant or include Capture Ready is based on a positive trade-off between risk and 
return. In reality, some investors will be affected by frame dependence or various heuristic-
driven biases (Shefrin, 2007). A survey of decision-making behaviour of key opinion leaders 
and institutions used when investing in the power sector may therefore improve the model.   
 33
  
Estimates of Transport, Storage and Monitoring Costs 
Transport, storage, and monitoring cost data are based on expert estimations found in the 
IPCC Special Report (IPCC, 2006). However, the report does not mention the dates 
associated with the cost estimates, which may affect the model results. We assume costs are 
based on 2006 data and are adjusted by fixed-capital inflation in our model, but a better 
understanding of the underlying costs overall is necessary. 
 
The On-going Electricity Market Reforms in China 
The Chinese electricity market still requires substantial market-oriented reform – recent 
assessments have found that the on-going reform appears ‘limited to symbolic institutional 
changes rather than a real renovation of its central-planned style’ (Yang, 2005). In our paper, 
the option pricing model is not based on a liberalized and competitive electricity market. 
Therefore, if the Chinese electricity market is liberalized over the time horizon, the model 
would require substantial modification.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Making coal-fired plants Capture Ready is a critical stage on the path to a low-carbon 
economy in a country such as China where a large number of coal-fired power plants are 
under construction or being planned but where binding carbon constraints are not imminent.  
Unfortunately, existing financial incentives are unable to finance Capture Ready – both 
governments and electric utilities are reluctant to invest. To resolve the dilemma, we suggest 
that newly built fossil fuel plants, which are not currently considering Capture Ready because 
of the absence of any incentive, issue Capture Options in order to finance Capture Ready by 
drawing in foreign investors and others interested in low-carbon investment opportunities.  
 
Not surprisingly, our analysis finds that the value of Capture Options and Capture Ready 
investments are more attractive in high carbon-price growth scenarios. The potential 
significant cash inflow from issuing Capture Option may encourage new plants to consider 
and even optimize Capture Ready arrangements. Furthermore, it may improve stakeholder 
awareness of the value of Capture Ready. Investors concerned about the growth in Chinese 
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 emissions might also become interested in Capture Ready, not only because it raises the 
possibility of affecting the emissions path in China’s rapidly growing power sector but also 
because the investment would be attractive relative to other options. 
 
Through the analysis, we hope to have begun to answer several major research questions 
outlined at the end of Section 3.  
 
 How can a Capture Option finance Capture Ready? 
If the gross value of Capture Ready is higher than the required capital outlay of Capture 
Ready, plant owners can invest in Capture Ready to maximize their profits by selling Capture 
Options at a later date. In theory, a plant owner should finance Capture Ready until the 
marginal benefits from greater investment in Capture Ready is equal to the marginal cost of 
the additional capital outlay.  
 
 What is the potential benefit of Capture Ready? 
We evaluated a specific Capture Ready proposal for a 600 MW supercritical unit in China and 
found the gross value of Capture Ready (before capital outlays) to be between CNY3m 
($0.4m) and 630m ($84m) using an 8% discount rate. Capture Ready investment may 
increase the value of the project and reduce the operating risk of the high carbon prices. On 
the other hand, we find Capture Ready is highly sensitive to the discount rate (required return) 
of a project. In a high option value (HO) scenario, based on an assumption of 1% additional 
capital outlays for Capture Ready, the net value of Capture Ready varies from CNY803m 
($107m) at a 6% discount rate to CNY43m ($5.7m) at a 12% discount rate.  
 
 What is the value of a Capture Option? 
The value of a Capture Option is highly dependent on the assumptions made with regard to 
electricity price, carbon price and coal price (or the probability distribution of scenarios). In 
our case study, at a discount rate of 8%, across all scenarios, the gross value of the Capture 
Option for a 600 MW coal-fired supercritical unit in China ranges from CNY1m ($0.1m) to 
627m ($83.6m) without Capture Ready, and from CNY2m ($0.3m) to 1255m ($167.3m) with 
Capture Ready. The value of a Capture Option is also sensitive to discount rates; for example, 
under the high option value scenario (HO), the value varies from more than CNY2400m 
($320m) using a 6% discount rate down to CNY97m ($12.9m) at 12%. Finally, arguably the 
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 most important benefit of a tradable Capture Option is to encourage stakeholders to treat the 
Capture Option as a valuable asset and Capture Ready as an important investment decision.  
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 Appendix I. Coding Rule for Scenarios and Impacts of Uncertainties 
 
Codes & Impacts of Inputs' Uncertainties 
          
  Low High Impact on Capture Option Value 
Impact on 
Project’s NPV 
Construction Cycle ccL ccH insignificant adverse 
Year 2 3     
          
Capacity Load before Capture cbcL cbcH adverse positive 
     See Table 3 Low High     
          
Capacity Load after Capture cacL cacH positive positive 
     See Table 3 Low High     
          
Transport, Storage & Monitoring Cost tmsL tmsH adverse adverse 
CNY/mtonCO2 0.6 16.3     
          
Basic Inflation infL infH adverse positive 
  1.5 4．5     
          
Carbon Price Growth cpgL cpgH positive adverse 
  4.5% 8%     
          
Correlation (coal, carbon) cccL cccH adverse insignificant 
  -10% -60%     
          
Correlation (electricity, carbon) cecL cecH adverse insignificant 
  20% 80%     
          
Capture Ready Investment cr ncr positive positive 
(Ignore CR Capital)         
          
Discount Rate     adverse adverse 
                        6%, 8%, 10%, 12%         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37
 References 
 
Bohm, M.C., Herzog, H.J., Parsons, J.E., Sekar, R.C., Capture-ready coal plants—Options, 
technologies and economics, International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Technologies, 1: 113-120.  
 
Booth, N J. (2005). Secondment to the International Test Centre for CO2 Capture (ITC), University of 
Regina, Canada. Report No: DTI/Pub URN/06/798. Available at:  
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file32307.pdf
 
Brockett, S. (2007a). Impact Assessment for Enabling Legal Framework for Carbon Capture & 
Storage, CO2NET East Kick-off meeting, Zagreb, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.geology.cz/co2net-east/download/workshop-zagreb/Scott%20Brockett%20(EC) 
 
Brockett, S. (2007b). Presentation at the European Climate Change Program (ECCP) Stakeholder 
Meeting, Brussels, May 2007  
 
Brown, T. (2006). Engineering Economics and Economic Design for Process Engineers, CRC Press.  
 
China Electricity Council (CEC) (2007). Zhongguo Dianli Gongye Tongji Kuai Bao (Chinese 
Electricity Industry Statistics Report). Available at: http://www.cec.org.cn/news/showc.asp?id=92985
 
CHNG (2007). News of China Huaneng Group. Available at: 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_38519.html 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_45552.html 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_14358.html 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_34955.html 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_40063.html 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_54103.html 
http://www.chng.com.cn/minisite/news/new/news_index_53437.html 
 
Clarke, D. (2006). BlackRock's New Energy Fund Lures Investors on Climate Change, 
Bloomberg.com, 24 October, Available at: 
http://www.csid.com.cn/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=45989  
 
 38
 Commission of the European Communities (EC), (2007). Sustainable power generation from fossil 
fuels: Aiming for near-zero emissions from coal after 2020, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2006) 843 final, Brussels, 10 January. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/16_communication_fossil_fuels_en.pdf
 
Deloitte (2007). China's Unified Enterprise Income Tax Law brings Greater Clarity, Transparency & 
Fairness to the Tax System, Available at: 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid=7062&cid=149787,00.html
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2003). Our Energy Future: Creating a low carbon economy, 
London: TSO. 
 
DTI (2006). The Energy Challenge, London: Department of Trade and Industry, available at: 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31890.pdf
 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2006). International Energy Outlook 2006, ed. U.S. 
Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html
 
G8 (2005). Gleneagles Plan of Action, Gleneagles. Available at:  
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_CCChangePlanofAction.pdf
 
GE-EER (2000). Simultaneous Production of High-Purity Hydrogen and Sequestration-Ready CO2 
from Syngas: Computer Model Development, DOE Award Number: DE-FG26-99FT40682—01. 
Available at: 
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/881983-QWy9JC/881983.PDF
 
Gibbins. J. (2004) Making pulverized coal plant “capture ready”: methods and benefits, 7th 
International CO2 Capture Network Meeting, Vancouver, Canada. March 2004. 
 
Gibbins. J., Li J., Liang, X. (2006). Capture ready fossil fuel plants: a critical stage in tackling climate 
change, Proceedings of the 7th European IGCC conference, Barcelona, Spain, 25-27 April. 
 
HM Treasury, (2006). Carbon capture and storage: A consultation on barriers to commercial 
deployment. Available at: 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/C/9/pbr06_carboncapture_responsesummary_185.pdf
 39
  
Huaneng Intl. Inc. (Huaneng). (2007), Huaneng Power International, Inc.’s Annual Report on Form 
20-F 2006, SEC (US), Available at  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/929058/000134100407001245/hpi20f-ar.txt
 
Institute for Chemical Engineers (IChemE) (2007) Capture Ready Study. Available at: 
http://www.icheme.org/captureready.pdf
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2006). IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2006). Energy Technology Perspective: Scenarios & Strategies to 
2050. Paris: OECD. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007). World Energy Outlook 2007 – China and India Insights. 
Paris: OECD. 
 
International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas Programme (IEA GHG) (2007).  R, D and D Projects 
Database.  http://www.co2captureandstorage.info/ 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), (2007). World Economic and Financial Surveys: World 
Economic Outlook Database, Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx
 
Liang, X. (2006). Capture Ready: Progress, Opinion and Finance, PhD Winter Conference at Judge 
Business School, University of Cambridge, December.  
 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (2004), Clean Power, in NRDC's China Clean Energy 
Project. Available at: http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/china/cleanpower.asp
 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2007). 'Shang Da Ya Xiao' Jieneng Jianpai 
Gongzuo Huiyi  (An Energy Conservation Conference) (in Chinese), National Development and 
Reform Commission, Available at: http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/nyjt/zhdt/t20070201_115294.htm
 
 40
 Otter, N. (2006). Carbon Abatement Technologies for Fossil Fuels, Presented at UK-China Workshop 
on Cleaner Energy Policy and Technology, Xiamen, China, 13-15 June 
 
Platts (2006). New supercritical boiler, coal-fired plant proposed by E.On UK, International Coal 
Report, 27 October. Available at: 
http://www.platts.com/Coal/highlights/2006/coalp_icr_102706.xml
 
Reiner, D., Liang, X., Sun, X., Zhu, Y., Li, D., (2007), Stakeholder Attitudes towards Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage Technologies in China, International Climate Change Conference, Hong Kong, 
May 29-31 2007 
 
Rosenberg, W. G., Walker, M.R., and Alpem, D.C. (2005). National Gasification Strategy:  
Gasification of Coal & Biomass as a Domestic Gas Supply Option; Harvard University, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government: Cambridge, MA, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.belfercenter.org/files/gasification_2005.pdf
 
RWE (2006). RWE Group, RWE npower announces feasibility study for 1000MW ‘Clean Coal’ 
power station, Press release, 12 April. Available at: 
http://www.npowermediacentre.com/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=676&NewsAreaID=2
 
SASOL (2006). Sasol and Chinese sign landmark coal-to-liquids agreement. Press Release, 22 June. 
Available at: 
www.sasol.com/sasol_internet/frontend/navigation.jsp?articleTypeID=2&articleId=14900002
 
Shefrin, H. (2002). Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioural Finance and the Psychology 
of Investing, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT) (2000). Qiye Suodeshui Shuqian Kouchu Banfa (Tax 
Deduction Method of Enterprise's Income tax). Available at:  
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n480513/n480919/index.html
 
Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) (2006). Plans for the UK's First Cleaner Coal Power Plant at 
FerryBridge Power Station. Available at: 
http://www.scottish-southern.co.uk/SSEInternet/index.aspx?id=2550  
 41
 Stern, N. et al, (2006), The Economics of Climate Change, Part Three: The Economics of Stabilisation, 
Available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3F8/81/ch_7_projecting_growth_of_ghg_emissions.pdf
 
Venkataraman, S. and Lundberg, D. (2007). How Close Is Carbon Capture And Sequestration To 
Being Ready For Prime Time? RatingsDirect, Standard & Poor’s, 11 May, pp. 7-8 
 
Wilson, M. and Gibbins, J. (2005). Getting Ready for Carbon Capture and Storage: Canada's Progress, 
Energy INET Report. 
 
Yang, H. (2005). Overview of the Chinese Electricity Industry and its Current Uses, Electricity Policy 
Research Group (EPRG) Working Paper 0517, University of Cambridge, Available at 
http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0517.pdf
 
 
 
 
 
 42
